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This  paper  proposes  a  new  statistical  procedure  which  aims  at  providing  robust 
estimates  of  volatility  around  official  liberalisation  dates,  by  using  data  driven 
techniques  to  identify  the  number  and  timing  of  structural  breaks  in  the  variance 
dynamics  of  stock  market  returns.  The  paper  illustrates  the  usefulness  of  the 
procedure  by  providing  an  empirical  application  that  focuses  on  five  East  Asian 
emerging markets, all of which liberalised their financial markets in the late 1980s or 
early 1990s, namely (South) Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand.  It is 
shown that (i) the detected breakdates in the volatility of stock market returns do not 
correspond to official liberalisation dates and (ii) the use of official liberalisation dates 
as  breakdates  is  likely  to  result  in  inaccurate  inference.    By  using  data  driven 
techniques to detect multiple structural changes a richer  and inevitably more accurate 
   pattern  of  volatility  dynamics  emerges  in  comparison  to  focussing  on  official 
liberalisation dates.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The effects of financial liberalisation on stock market volatility, which are of 
interest to policy makers worldwide, have been the subject of controversy ever since 
emerging market economies began liberalising their financial markets in the 1980s 
and early 1990s.
1 Following Keynes
2, several authors have proposed that financial 
liberalisation  could  attract  speculators  and  investors  with  short term  horizons, 
resulting in asset price bubbles and financial instability (e.g. Allen and Gale, 2000; 
Arestis and Demetriades, 1997, 1999; Singh, 1997, 2003).  Stock market volatility 
could,  however,  decline following  financial liberalisation  if  the  number  of  traders 
increases (see Tauchen and Pitt, 1983).  Empirical evidence on the subject is mixed, 
depending on the countries and periods that are studied, with recent studies showing 
that the outcome  may  depend on market characteristics, such as transparency and 
investor protection (e.g. Jayasuriya, 2005).  
Previous empirical studies on the effects of financial liberalisation on stock 
market volatility implicitly assume that (i) there is a single break in the properties of 
the  stock  market  returns;  (ii)  the  timing  of  the  break  (breakdate)  is  known  and 
coincides with the official stock market liberalisation date (or in some instances the 
announcement date).  However, these assumptions are unlikely to be realistic for a 
number of reasons.   With respect to (i), it is likely that there may be more than one 
break, which may or may not be directly due to stock market liberalisation. This could 
be  because  financial  liberalisation  is  a  broader  concept  than  stock  market 
liberalisation, in that it also includes other important areas of the financial system, 
such as the deregulation of banking activities, the lifting of interest rate controls, the 
removal  of  directed  credit  programmes,  all  of  which  have  been  widespread  in 
emerging  market  economies.
3   It  may  also  be  due  to  changes  in  the  political  or 
institutional environment, which may impact on investor behaviour. With respect to 
                                                 
1 While the effects of financial liberalisation on stock market volatility are debatable, the view that increased 
volatility  is  undesirable  is  less  controversial.  Increased  volatility  is  associated  with  higher  capital  costs  and, 
consequently, lower investment; the latter may also decline because the ‘option to wait’ increases (Bekaert and 
Harvey, 1997).  Empirical evidence provides some credence to this view. See, for example, Arestis et al (2001) 
who show that stock market volatility has negative effects on long run economic growth using quarterly data from 
five developed economies. 
2 Keynes (1964) regards liquidity as having destabilising effect on the market because of the assumption of market 
imperfection, particularly in relation to the availability of information to all participants. 
3 The typical sequencing of financial reforms in these economies usually starts from the lifting of interest rate 
controls and other banking restraints (see, for example, Arestis and Demetriades, 1999).  This may well result in 
breaks in stock market volatility since the shares of banks frequently represent a large fraction of stock market 
capitalisation.   3 
(ii), the breakdate in the data may or may not coincide with official liberalisation 
dates because financial market participants may adjust their behaviour well before or 
even after the official liberalisation dates, depending, for example, on the timing and 
credibility of announcements.  For these reasons, the estimates of volatility changes 
due to financial liberalisation obtained by previous studies are likely to be biased or 
inefficient.
4 One of the purposes of this paper is to demonstrate that this is indeed the 
case using East Asian emerging markets as an example.  
The main purpose of the paper is to propose a statistical procedure which aims 
at providing more robust estimates of volatility around official liberalisation dates 
than  those  available  in  the  literature  by  identifying  the  number  and  timing  of 
structural breaks that occur.
5  The procedure starts by utilising a number of CUSUM 
type non parametric tests to detect potential breaks in the unconditional variance of 
the returns process. Once the potential breaks have been identified, robustness tests 
are carried out using a set of more powerful tests to verify that the unconditional 
variance of each regime is statistically different. The last step is to measure volatility 
in each regime by using different estimators of volatility. 
We  illustrate  the  usefulness  of  the  procedure  by  proving  an  empirical 
application that focuses on five East Asian emerging markets, all of which liberalised 
their  financial  markets  in  the  late  1980s  or  early  1990s,  namely  (South)  Korea, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan and Thailand. These countries have been extensively 
studied in the broader literature on financial development, not least because of their 
importance to the world economy and the availability of reliable data.
6  They can 
therefore provide an excellent platform from which to highlight the importance of 
correctly identifying the number and timing of structural breaks. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the statistical procedure 
for obtaining robust estimates of stock market volatility when multiple breaks may be 
present.    Section  3  describes  the  data  and  data  sources  and  provides  the  official 
financial liberalisation dates in each of the five East Asian countries studied, drawing 
on  relevant  literature.  Section  4  presents  the  findings  of  the  empirical  application 
while Section 5 summarises and concludes.  
                                                 
4 It is an established fact that not taking into account structural breaks in the estimation of GARCH type models 
may result in over estimating volatility persistence (Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990).   
5 Because we use three different estimators of volatility which are valid under different sets of assumptions, we 
prefer not to refer to these estimators as ‘unbiased’, even though at least one of these is likely to be depending on 
the true underlying data generating process, which is of course unknown. 
6 See, for example, Demetriades and Luintel (2001) and Demetriades, Devereux and Luintel (1998).    4 
 
2. Obtaining Robust Volatility Estimates   
 
This  section  outlines  a  statistical  procedure  which  aims  at  providing  more 
robust estimates of volatility around official liberalisation dates. Section 2.1 describes 
the first step of the procedure, which is to identify the number and timing of all the 
potential breaks.  Section 2.2 refers to the second step of the procedure, which is to 
verify the existence of each break using a battery of robustness tests. Finally, Section 
2.3 contains the third step of the procedure, which is to measure volatility in each of 
the segments that have been defined in the previous steps. 
 
2.1.  The number and timing of breaks 
 
The techniques that are employed to detect the number and identify the timing 
of structural breaks draw on the literature that aims at detecting a single break in the 
volatility dynamics. Specifically, we use the following tests. 
 
(1) I&T (Inclan and Tiao, 1994) 
(2) SAC1 (The first test of Sansó, Aragó, and Carrion, 2003) 
(3) SAC2
BT (The second test of Sansó, Aragó, and Carrion, 2003, which uses 
the Bartlett kernel) 
(4) SAC2
QS (The second test of Sansó, Aragó, and Carrion, 2003, which uses 
the Quadratic Spectral kernel)  
(5) K&L (Kokoszka and Leipus, 2000). 
 
  Karoglou (2006b) shows that the relative performance of each of the above 
tests depends on the underlying data generating process (DGP).  For example, the 
I&T  is  found  to  be  the  most  sensitive  to  the  existence  of  volatility  breaks  for 
independent  and  identically  distributed  data  but  suffers  severe  size  distortions  for 
strongly dependent data. In contrast, the K&L and the SAC2 variants do not exhibit 
size  distortions  but  their  power  is  smaller,  while  the  performance  of  SAC1  lies 
somewhere in between.
7 As a result, when the DGP is not known, it is preferable to 
                                                 
7 Sansó, Aragó, and Carrion, (2003) derive some theoretical results on the properties of I&T, SAC1, 
and SAC2 for data generating processes with different kurtosis while Andreou and Ghyssels (2002) 
provide some simulation evidence for I&T and K&L.    5 
use all of the tests and to select the breakdate based on an appropriate rule, depending 
on the specific objective of the exercise.  
The  above  tests  can  also  be  used  to  identify  multiple  breaks  in  a  series. 
However, in this case it would be necessary to incorporate these tests in an iterative 
scheme (algorithm) and to apply them to sub samples of the series, defined by the 
detected breakpoints. Inclan and Tiao (1994) propose a version of such an algorithm, 
which they name Iterative Cumulative Sums of Squares (ICSS).  However, Karoglou 
(2006a) shows that ICSS may not be robust to the presence of transitional periods 
between  volatility  regimes.  Such periods  are  likely  to  exist  when  the  response  of 
market participants to new information is a gradual one, which may be particularly 
relevant  in  emerging  market  economies.  For  this  reason,  this  paper  employs  an 
algorithm that is more robust to the existence of transitional periods introduced by 
Karoglou  (2006a).  When  there  are  no  transitional  periods,  Karoglou’s  algorithm 
produces  identical  results  as  ICSS,  assuming  the  underlying  tests  detect  the  true 
breakdate.  This algorithm involves the following six steps: 
 
1. Calculate the test statistic under consideration. 
2.  If  the  statistic  is  above  the  critical  value  split  the  particular  data 
segment into two parts at the corresponding point. 
3.  Repeat  steps  1  and  2  for  the  first  segment  until  no  more  (earlier) 
change-points are found. 
4. Mark this point as an estimated change-point of the whole series. 
5.  Remove  the  observations  that  precede  this  point  (i.e.  those  that 
constitute the first segment). 
6.  Consider  the  remaining  observations  as  the  new  sample  and  repeat 
steps 1 to 5 until no more change-points are found. 
 
The above algorithm is implemented with each of the (single breakdate CUSUM 




2.2.  Robustness Tests 
 
After detecting the potential breakdates and corresponding volatility regimes 
using the Karoglou algorithm, we use a battery of robustness tests in order to confirm   6 
that neighbouring regimes have different variances. These robustness tests involve a 
different approach to the CUSUM type tests in that they test for the homogeneity of 
variances of distinct samples (in our case these samples are two successive regimes) 
without considering the time series dimension of the data. In this paper we use (1) the 
standard  F test,  (2)  the  Siegel Tukey  test  with  continuity  correction  (Siegel  and 
Tukey, 1960, and Sheskin, 1997), (3) the adjusted Bartlett test (see Sokal and Rohlf, 
1995, and Judge, et al., 1985), and (4) the Levene test (1960).
8  
The  F test  requires  equal  sample  sizes  and  is  sensitive  to  departures  from 
normality. This is not the case for the Siegel Tukey test, which however assumes that 
the samples are independent and have equal median. The Bartlett test is also robust 
when the sample sizes are not equal, however it is still sensitive to departures from 
normality. Its adjusted version considers a correction factor for the critical values and 
the  arcsine square  root  transformation  of  the  data  in  order  to  conform  with  the 
normality assumption. The Levene test is an alternative to the Bartlett test and is less 
sensitive than the Bartlett test to departures from normality. 
 
2.3.  Volatility Estimators 
 
The  magnitude  and  direction  of  the  change  in  volatility  is  proxied  by  the 
unconditional variance in each regime, utilising three alternative estimators: (i) the 
sample  standard  deviation;  (ii)  the  square  root  of  a  Heteroskedasticity  and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) estimator of the variance –there are a lot of options 
to choose from but in this paper we use the VARHAC estimator of den Haan, 1997 
that bypasses the problem of selecting an appropriate bandwidth; (iii) the square root 
of the unconditional variance of the best fitting GARCH specification and calculating 
the unconditional variance that it suggests.
9  This allows us to examine the evolution 
of volatility throughout the sample period. 
 
3.  East Asian Data and Liberalisation Dates 
 
It is widely accepted that the conditional mean of the returns exhibits little 
predictability from the past (Bekaert and Harvey, 1997).  However, we also consider 
                                                 
8 These tests are calculated in Eviews. 
9We  define  the  ‘best  fitting  GARCH’  as  the  GARCH  with  the  largest  log likelihood  and  with 
statistically significant coefficients (at the 5% level). Information criteria are not used mainly because 
of their limited ability to identify the true structure of GARCH type processes (Mitchell and McKenzie, 
2003).   7 
the  possibility  of  moving  average  error  terms  induced  by  calendar  effects.    We 
therefore follow the procedure suggested by Pagan and Schwert (1990) to remove 
potential day of the week effects.    
  The  data  used  in  this  paper  are  the  continuously  compounded  daily  stock 
returns  obtained  by  the  daily  closing  stock  price  indexes,  expressed  in  the  local 
currency
10 of: (i) Korea Stock Price Index; (ii) Taiwan Weighted Stock Index; (iii) 
Kuala Lumpur Composite Index; (iv) Stock Exchange of Thailand Index and (v) the 
Philippines Stock Exchange Composite Index. The sample period spans four years 
before  and  after  official  financial  liberalisation  dates.    The  data  is  obtained  from 
Datastream.  
 
Financial Liberalisation Dates of East Asian Emerging Markets 
 
The  selection  of  the  official  liberalisation  dates  for  five  Asian  emerging 
markets draws on the following papers: Santis and Imrohoroglu (1997), Henry (2000), 
Kim  and  Singal  (2000),  Bekaert  and  Harvey  (2000),  Fuchs Schundeln  and  Funke 
(2001), Kassimatis (2002) and Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002). Table 1 summarises 
the liberalisation dates used in each of these papers and lists those that we adopt in the 
rest of this paper, namely the ones that most papers agree on. These are as follows: 
January  1992  for  South  Korea,  January  1991  for  Taiwan,  December  1988  for 
Malaysia, September 1987 for Thailand and June 1991 for the Philippines.  
 
Table 1: Official Financial Liberalisation Dates in East Asia 







Kim and Singal 
(2000) 
Bekaert and Harvey 
(2000) 
Korea  Jan 92  Jun 87  Jan 92  Jan 92 
Malaysia  Dec 88  May 87  Dec 88  Dec 88 
Philippines  Oct 89  May 86  Jul 86  Jun 91 
Taiwan  Jan 91  May 86  Jan 91  Jan 91 
Thailand  Dec 88  Jan 88  Aug 88  Sep 87 











Korea  Jan 92  Jan 92  Jan 92  Jan-92 
Malaysia  Dec 88  NA  Dec 88  Dec-88 
Philippines  Jun 91  Nov 91  Jun 91  Jun-91 
Taiwan  Jan 91  Jan 91  Jan 91  Jan-91 
Thailand  Sep 87  NA  Sep 87  Sep-87 
 
Table  2  presents  some  descriptive  statistics  for  the  stock  returns  in  these 
markets for the full sample and the two sub sample periods defined by the official 
                                                 
10 US dollar indexes are not employed in order to avoid introducing exchange rate volatility effects.   8 
liberalisation dates. Based on this preliminary description of the data, it appears that 
(i)  the  mean  of  stock  returns  increased  in  the  cases  of  Korea,  Malaysia  and  the 
Philippines following financial liberalisation while it decreased in the cases of Taiwan 
and Thailand; (ii) the stock return volatility (as measured by the standard deviation) 
appears to have declined after liberalisation in four of the five countries, the exception 
being Thailand, where it appears to have increased considerably.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Stock Returns 
Period Mean St. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis Observations
Full Sample (Jan 88 – Dec 95) 0.0108 0.5969 0.2929 2.9882 2086
Pre-Lib (Jan 88 – Dec 91) 0.0063 0.6231 0.1928 3.0126 1043
Post-Lib (Jan 92 – Dec 95) 0.0153 0.5694 0.4275 2.8626 1043
Full Sample (Dec 84 – Nov 92) 0.0158 0.6326  2.0698 24.6773 2086
Pre-Lib (Dec 84 – Nov 88) 0.0062 0.7442  2.1061 21.6072 1043
Post-Lib (Dec 88 – Nov 92) 0.0254 0.4967  1.4075 18.6465 1043
Full Sample (Jun 87 – May 95) 0.0314 0.8577  0.1761 10.5878 2088
Pre-Lib (Jun 87 – May 91) 0.027 1.0506  0.2043 8.5135 1045
Post-Lib (Jun 91 – May 95) 0.0357 0.6064 0.1088 2.2532 1043
Full Sample (Jan 87 – Dec 94) 0.04 1.04  0.0905 1.8429 2087
Pre-Lib (Jan 87 – Dec 90) 0.0613 1.2187  0.1363 0.9397 1043
Post-Lib (Jan 91 – Dec 94) 0.0187 0.8237  0.0161 2.8274 1044
Full Sample (Sept 83 – Aug 91)  0.0329 0.6073  0.8298 11.5289 2087
Pre-Lib (Sept 83 – Aug 87)  0.0371 0.2689 0.1676 8.1141 1043








































4. Empirical Application 
 
4.1.  The number and timing of breaks 
 
Table  3  reports  the  results  of  applying  the  Karoglou  (2006a)  algorithm 
outlined in Section 2, utilising the five non parametric tests also described in the same 
section. Not all the breakdates suggested by the algorithm are adopted because some 
of the tests may exaggerate the number of breakdates if there is volatility persistence 
or the innovation term is not Gaussian (SAC, 2002, Karoglou 2006).
11   The adopted 
breakdates satisfy the following two conditions (Rule A): 
i)  Segment size: The two derived segments (before and after the breakdate) 
contain at least 50 observations each.  
ii)  Significance: Two or more statistics indicate the existence of the break at the 
5% level  
We also adopt the following subsidiary rule (Rule B) in cases where no breakdate has 
been detected in the pre or post liberalisation period by Rule A: 
                                                 
11 The I&T test for example has been found to diverge in such cases.   9 
iii)  Segment size: The two derived segments (before and after the breakdate) 
contain at least 50 observations each.  
iv)  Significance: One statistic indicates the existence of the break at the 1% 
level and it is the first (before) after the official liberalisation date suggested 
by this statistic.  
Following Rule A, we adopt three breakdates in the case of Korea, 16 April 
1990, 10 December 1992 and 1 March 1994.  The first two are suggested by all five 
tests, with four of the statistics significant at the 1% level.  The third breakdate is 
suggested by four tests, one of which at the 1% level.  
Applying Rule A we adopt two breakdates in the case of Malaysia, 19 October 
1987 and 19 January 1988.  Both breakdates are suggested by four tests, of which 
three are significant at the 1% level.  Rule B is applicable in the case of Malaysia 
because  Rule  A  does  not  result  in  a  breakdate  being  adopted  after  the  official 
liberalisation date of 1 December 1988.  This rule suggests a third breakdate of 26 
August  1991,  since  the  I&T  test  is  significant  at  the  1%  level  and  the  derived 
segments contain more than 50 observations each. 
In  the  case  of  the  Phillipines,  the  application  of  Rule  A  results  in  four 
breakdates being adopted, 20 December 1987, 25 September 1991, 4 October 1993 
and 6 May 1994. The first one is suggested by four statistics at the 1% level, the 
second one by all five at the 1% level, the third and fourth also by five tests, albeit 
only three at the 1% level. 
The application of Rule A in the case of Taiwan results in three breakdates 
being adopted, 2 April 1990, 12 March 1991, and 29 October 1991.  The first two are 
suggested by all five tests at the 1% level.  The third is also suggested by all five tests, 
albeit only three at the 1% level. 
Finally,  the  application  of  Rule  A  to  the  case  of  Thailand  results  in  three 
breakdates being adopted, 28 August 1986, 1 August 1990 and 27 February 1991.  
The first two are suggested by all five tests at the 1% level, while the third is also 
suggested by all five tests, of which four at the 1% level.  Three of the tests detect a 
fourth breakdate that is, however, not adopted because the resulting segment contains 
only 43 observations, hence condition (i) is not satisfied. 
  
 
   10 
Table 3: Detected Structural Changes 
datapoint I&T SAC1 SAC2
BT SAC2
QS K&L adopted
597 √ √ √* √ √ yes (16 04 90)
1291 √ √ √* √ √ yes (10 12 92)
1607 √ √*   √* √* yes (01 03 94)
1828 √*         no
1873 √*         no
751 √ √   √ √* yes (19 10 87)
818 √ √   √ √* yes (19 01 88)
1756 √         yes (26 08 91)
1818 √*         no
110 √         no
149   √ √ √ √ yes (20 12 87)
1128 √ √ √ √ √ yes (25 09 91)
1656 √ √ √* √ √* yes (04 10 93)
1810 √ √ √* √ √* yes (06 05 94)
1952 √         no
2037 √*         no
848 √ √ √ √ √ yes (02 04 90)
1094 √ √ √ √ √ yes (12 03 91)
1259 √ √ √* √ √* yes (29 10 91)
1558 √         no
1647 √         no
1803 √         no
1875 √         no
2025 √         no
2046 √         no
781 √ √ √ √ √ yes (28 08 86)
1805 √ √ √ √ √ yes (01 08 90)
1955 √ √ √* √ √ yes (27 02 91)








































Note: √ denotes statistical significance at 1% level, √* at 5% level, and   no statistical significance. 
 
4.2.  Robustness Tests 
 
Table  4  reports  the  results  of  carrying  out  the  robustness  tests  outlined  in 
Section 2.  The same table also reports the results of applying the robustness tests to 
the segments defined by the official liberalisation dates. These tests confirm that the 
neighbouring  segments  resulting  from  the  adopted  breakdates  have  different 
variances, with the differences being significant at the 1% level.  The same tests also 
suggest  that  with  the  exception  of  Korea  the  variances  in  the  pre  and  post 
liberalisation periods are statistically different at the 1% level.  In the case of Korea 
three  of  the  tests  suggest  no  variance  change  after  the  official  liberalisation  date.  
Thus, by focussing on the official liberalisation date, one may fail to detect the regime 




   11 
Table 4: Robustness Tests 
F statistic Siegel Tukey Bartlett Levene
change in 
variance
before & after 
liberalisation
1.19† 0.41† 7.69 0.95† no
Regime 1 & 2 2.21 4.94 96.03 38.85 yes
Regime 2 & 3 1.93 2.56 42.94 15.02 yes
Regime 3 & 4 1.50 2.58 15.92 10.70 yes
before & after 
liberalisation
2.21 8.60 159.66 48.42 yes
Regime 1 & 2 10.21 4.89 296.10 114.05 yes
Regime 2 & 3 13.38 6.96 420.20 166.18 yes
Regime 3 & 4 2.41 4.60 52.77 37.38 yes
before & after 
liberalisation
3.02 5.97 303.13 68.56 yes
Regime 1 & 2 6.75 8.61 344.44 176.72 yes
Regime 2 & 3 2.27 5.50 103.82 42.33 yes
Regime 3 & 4 2.41 4.60 52.77 37.38 yes
Regime 4 & 5 2.13 3.15 29.69 18.67 yes
before & after 
liberalisation
2.13 10.61 145.00 114.14 yes
Regime 1 & 2 3.69 10.67 195.62 201.98 yes
Regime 2 & 3 3.45 7.27 65.98 66.59 yes
Regime 3 & 4 2.06 4.86 41.89 32.13 yes
before & after 
liberalisation
9.09 16.44 1072.55 265.60 yes
Regime 1 & 2 9.51 16.13 873.02 224.07 yes
Regime 2 & 3 5.55 8.31 278.93 170.04 yes








































Note: † denotes statistical insignificance (i.e. not significant at 5% level). In all other cases, the statistical 




4.3.  Volatility Estimates   
 
For each country we present the results using two figures, which report and 
illustrate  the  three  alternative  measures  of  volatility  in  (i)  the  pre  and  post 
liberalisation periods and (ii) each of the identified regimes.  In addition we also plot 
the stock returns in a separate figure, alongside one of the volatility estimates, to 
illustrate the evolution of stock returns in each regime.
12   
{Figure 1} 
Figure 1 shows that the estimated measures of volatility before and after the 
official liberalisation date of 1
 January 1992 have declined slightly. The GARCH 
                                                 
12 In this type of figure we include just one of the volatility estimates, for clarity of exposition.  It turns 
out that the three estimates are similar, so that the choice of estimator does not matter.    12 
derived estimate shows a decline of 9.8%, the standard deviation a decline of 8.3% 
and the VARHAC estimate shows a marginal decline of 0.3%.
13  
{Figure 2} 
In contrast, Figure 2 illustrates a much richer evolution of volatility in the pre 
and post liberalisation periods.  The volatility measures in the first segment, which 
covers the period 1 January 1988 – 15 April 1990, was, in fact considerably lower 
than suggested by Figure 1.  In the second segment, which covers a twenty month 
period before the official liberalisation data and an eleven  month period after the 
official  liberalisation  date,  volatility  increased  substantially:  the  GARCH  measure 
shows an increase of 51.6%, the standard deviation an increase of 48.7% and the 
VARHAC an increase of 33.3%. The third segment, however, which starts almost a 
year after the official liberalisation date is one of decreasing volatility, with the three 
measures  decreasing  by  29.5%,  28%  and  20%  respectively.    Finally,  the  fourth 
segment which starts twenty six months after the liberalisation date exhibits a further 
decline in volatility of 18.5% in both the first two measures and 18.0% in the third.  
As a result, a comparison of the first and fourth segment shows that volatility has 
declined  by  around  12.7%  (12.9%,  12.7%  and  12.5%,  respectively).    Figure  3 
illustrates the evolution of volatility through time, alongside the stock returns. 
{Figure 3} 
A plausible interpretation of the Korean results is as follows.  The first regime 
is  likely  to  correspond  to  the  period  before  any  news  regarding  stock  market 
liberalisation had reached the market.  The second regime may correspond to the 
period in which information about liberalisation reached market participants, creating 
uncertainty.  It is interesting, however, that the second regime continues well after the 
official liberalisation date.  Even in the third regime, which begins eleven months 
after the liberalisation date, uncertainty appears to be higher than in the first regime.  
It takes more than two years after the official liberalisation date before uncertainty is 
reduced to pre liberalisation levels.  Thus, focusing on the regimes that are based on 
the official liberalisation dates completely masks this rich volatility pattern.
14     
                                                 
13 Note, however, that the tests reported in Table 4 suggest that these changes may not be statistically significant 
in this particular case.   
 
14 It may also be argued that the four regimes found for Korea using data driven techniques correspond to different 
financial as opposed to stock market liberalisation periods.  The financial liberalisation indices constructed by 
Abiad and Mody (2005), which take on board credit controls, interest rate controls, entry barriers, regulations and   13 
A similar conclusion, if more pronounced, emerges by analysing the results 
for Malaysia that are presented in Figures 4 6.   Figure 4 suggests that liberalisation 
led  to  a  decline  in  volatility  of  between  28.4%  and  40.3%,  depending  on  which 
measure is used. Figure 5, on the other hand, reveals a much more striking evolution 
of volatility.  Volatility increases very substantially, for a period of three months, 
about a year before the official liberalisation date.  The standard deviation suggests an 
increase in volatility of 219.7% while VARHAC shows an increase of 128.1% and 
GARCH a smaller increase of 53.1%, which is nevertheless also rather large. About a 
year  before  the  liberalisation  date  of  1  December  1988  volatility  declines  quite 
substantially and remains low for a period of three and a half years: the GARCH 
measure shows a decline of 45.1%, the standard deviation a decline of 72.6% and the 
VARHAC a decrease of 61.8%. A further decline in volatility, in the range of 35 40% 
depending  on  the  measure  used,  occurs  in  the  fourth  regime,  which  starts 
approximately two years and nine months after the official liberalisation date.  As a 
result, volatility exhibits a decline in the range of 45.3 47.5%, depending on measure 
used, when the first and the last (fourth) regimes are compared. 
The Philippines exhibits an even richer evolution of volatility, given that there 
are  five  different  regimes.    Figure  7  shows  a  decline  in  volatility  in  the  post 
liberalisation period that ranges from 34.9% in the case of the GARCH measure to 
42.5% for the standard deviation.  This masks a much more considerable drop in 
volatility when one compares the first regime with the last (fifth) one, which ranges 
between 69.2% and 73.4% depending on the measure used. In between the first and 
fifth regimes there are two consecutive periods of declining volatility, followed by a 
period  of  increasing  volatility,  ending  with  a  period  of  declining  volatility.    The 
official liberalisation date falls three months before the end of the second regime.  The 
period of increased volatility, which lasts for about seven months, occurs more than 
two years after the official liberalisation date.   
The case of Taiwan is very similar to that of Malaysia and to some extent, 
Korea.    The  pre liberalisation  period  includes  a  regime  of  substantially  increased 
volatility which starts about nine months before the official liberalisation date and 
ends three months after. The increase in volatility ranges from 35.3% in the case of 
the  GARCH  measure  to  51.4%  for  the  standard  deviation.  This  period  is  then 
                                                                                                                                            
privatization, as well as controls on international transactions, would however suggest only three different regimes 
for Korea: 19986 88, 1989 90, and 1991 96.   14 
followed by two regimes of declining volatility, lasting about seven months and more 
than three years, respectively.  The decline in volatility between the first and fourth 
regimes  ranges  from  43.3%  to  51.6%  depending  on  which  measure  is  used.  
Comparing the pre and post liberalisation periods shows a decline in volatility in the 
range of 31.4% to 42.8%, which masks all the aforementioned changes.  
Thailand presents a sharp contrast to the other countries in that the results 
suggest an increase in volatility, following the financial liberalisation of 1 September 
1987.   The comparison of the pre and post liberalisation periods in Figure 13 shows 
an  increase  of  201.5%  for  the  standard  deviation  and  140.8%  for  the  VARHAC 
measure.    The  GARCH  measure  indicates  a  change  to  an  infinite  unconditional 
variance,  which  further  illustrates  the  limitations  of  artificially  imposing  a  single 
breakdate in the sample period.  The measures in Figure 14 show that volatility more 
than trebled about a year before the official liberalisation date.  This regime continues 
for  almost  three  years  after  the  liberalisation  date.  Moreover,  it  is  followed  by  a 
seven month period where volatility increases by 91.8% 135.4%, depending on the 
measure used. In the final period, which lasts about six months, volatility declines by 
about 50%, but this is not sufficient to bring it back to its pre liberalisation level. In 
fact, comparison of the first and last regimes suggests that volatility increased by 
189.1% 257.6%, depending on the measure employed.   Once again, a before and 







This paper highlights the importance of correctly identifying the number and 
timing of structural breaks when analysing changes in stock market volatility that may 
be directly or indirectly related to financial liberalisation. The volatility dynamics that 
emerge when breakdates are carefully extracted from the data are much richer than 
those suggested by studying the pre and post stock market liberalisation periods.  In 
three  of  the  five  countries  analysed     Korea,  Malaysia  and  Taiwan  –  volatility 
increases before the official liberalisation date and subsequently declines below its 
original level. Focussing only on the pre and post stock market liberalisation period 
altogether fails to detect a period of increased volatility, which in the case of Korea   15 
exceeds  two  years.    In  the  case  of  the  Philippines,  analysing  the  pre  and  post 
liberalisation periods, masks an initial marked decline in volatility and fails to pick up 
a period of substantially increased volatility that occurs more than two years after the 
official  liberalisation  date.    In  the  case  of  Thailand,  focussing  on  the  official 
liberalisation date fails to pick up a decline in volatility that occurs in the fourth 
(final)  regime,  which  nevertheless  is  not  sufficient  to  reduce  volatility  to  its  pre 
liberalisation  level.  In all  cases  the  analysis  of pre  and post  liberalisation periods 
results  in  an  ‘averaging out’  of  volatility  patterns.    Thus,  important  changes  in 
volatility  may  not  be  detected,  resulting  in  inaccurate  inference,  potentially 
misleading policy makers. Our findings would therefore suggest that the analysis of 
the  effects  of  financial  liberalisation  on  stock  market  uncertainty  remains  fertile 
ground for further research.   
An area where further research would be fruitful would be to examine whether 
the different volatility regimes that we detect using data driven techniques correspond 
to   or are indeed caused by   broader financial reforms, which are not directly linked 
to the opening of stock markets to foreign investors, such as the relaxation of credit 
and interest rate controls, entry barriers in banking, financial sector privatisation etc. 
The financial liberalisation literature now provides indices of financial liberalisation, 
albeit  at  frequencies  that  do  not  match  well  with  the  frequency  of  stock  market 
returns.
15  Such an exercise would therefore require some additional data work as well 
as novel econometric approaches to address the causality issue. 
                                                 
15 See for example Abiad and Mody (2005), who provide such an index for 35 economies, on an annual 
basis for the period 1973 1996.   16 
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Appendix I – the GARCH models 
 
The table that follows presents the GARCH model that best fits the data of each 
segment. Note that * denotes insignificance at 10% level; in its place the standard 
deviation is used. 






before liberalization   0.0263 0.2296  0.1140 0.8165    
  (0.0052) (0.04) (0.0435) (0.0261)    
after liberalization   0.0093 0.0537   2.1200  1.8877 0.6843
  (0.0025) (0.0094)   (0.0738) (0.1238) (0.0655)
segment 1   0.0776 0.1474   0.5569    
  (0.0289) (0.0431)   (0.1347)    
segment 2   0.0487 0.1811   0.7380    
  (0.0109) (0.0273)   (0.0305)    
segment 3   0.2975 0.0070        
  (0.0220) (0.0463)        
segment 4   0.1820 0.0844        
  (0.0121)  0.0508        
before liberalization   0.0104 0.1649  0.1147 0.9279    
  (0.0021) (0.0226) (0.019) (0.0107)    
after liberalization   0.0913 0.2758   0.3470    
  (0.0094) (0.0446)   (0.0705)    
segment 1   0.0149 0.0439   0.9172    
  (0.0058) (0.0128)   (0.0244)    
segment 2   0.2805      0.1165 0.8029  
  (0.0678)     (0.018) (0.0297)  
segment 3   0.0878 0.2045   0.4695    
  (0.0149) (0.0377)   (0.0876)    
segment 4   0.0865 0.2413        
  (0.0061) (0.0716)        
before liberalization   0.0127 0.1546  0.0883 0.9193    
  (0.003) (0.035) (0.0359) (0.0098)    
after liberalization   0.0090 0.0625   0.9133    
  (0.0028) (0.0125)   (0.0167)    
segment 1   2.6168 0.3842        
  (0.2608) (0.1102)        
segment 2   0.0285 0.0713   0.8806    
  (0.007) (0.0112)   (0.0201)    
segment 3   0.0244 0.1563   0.1821 0.5788  
  (0.0101) (0.0423)   (0.0829) (0.0991)  
segment 4   0.6700*  0.0437*        
  (0.074) (0.0646)        
segment 5   0.0075     1.9538  0.9788  
  (0.0025)     (0.0175) (0.0175)  
before liberalization 0.1301 0.0250 0.1190   0.8665    
(0.0278) (0.0081) (0.0235)   (0.0247)    
after liberalization   0.0152 0.0579   0.9156    
  (0.0032) (0.0083)   (0.0104)    
segment 1 0.1267 0.0220 0.1107   0.8777    
(0.0277) (0.007) (0.0208)   (0.0212)    
segment 2   0.0308  0.0285   1.0196    
  (0.0045) (0.0017)   (0.0027)    
segment 3   0.0497  0.0701   0.1443 0.8825  
  (0.0117) (0.029)   (0.0026) (0.0247)  
segment 4   0.0120 0.0344   1.3999  0.4589  
  (0.0045) (0.0125)   (0.2336) (0.2145)  
before liberalization  0.0174 0.0011 0.2546  0.1260 0.8689    
(0.0049) (0.0002) (0.0405) (0.0429) (0.0136)    
after liberalization 0.0455 0.0073 0.2019  0.0687 0.8695    
(0.0154) (0.0016) (0.0277) (0.0311) (0.0116)    
segment 1  0.0224 0.0037 0.1981   0.7190    
(0.0051) (0.0009) (0.0248)   (0.0402)    
segment 2 0.0694 0.0076 0.1274   0.8579    
(0.0133) (0.0018) (0.0134)   (0.0125)    
segment 3   1.5078 0.2117        
  (0.1943) (0.1242)        
segment 4   0.3125 0.2273        
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Appendix II - Figures  
Figure 1 


















































































garch 0.512 0.776 0.547 0.446
st. dev. 0.511 0.760 0.547 0.446
































2.0 Stock Returns Unconditional Variance Korea
 
Note: the magnitude of the volatility that is depicted in all cases is the VARHAC estimate of den Haan. Also, the 
dashed line presents the volatility as given by the two segments defined by the official liberalisation date. The 
continuous line presents the volatility as given by the segments identified by the procedure of Section 2.   21 
Figure 4 





































































































garch 0.618 0.946 0.519 0.338
st. dev. 0.605 1.934 0.529 0.336
































2.0 Stock Returns Unconditional Variance Malaysia
 
Note: the magnitude of the volatility that is depicted in all cases is the VARHAC estimate of den Haan. Also, the 
dashed line presents the volatility as given by the two segments defined by the official liberalisation date. The 
continuous line presents the volatility as given by the segments identified by the procedure of Section 2. 
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Figure 7 
























































































































garch 2.061 0.770 0.543 0.801 0.548
st. dev. 2.014 0.776 0.515 0.800 0.548


































2.0 Stock Returns Unconditional Variance The Phillipines
 
Note: the magnitude of the volatility that is depicted in all cases is the VARHAC estimate of den Haan. Also, the 
dashed line presents the volatility as given by the two segments defined by the official liberalisation date. The 
continuous line presents the volatility as given by the segments identified by the procedure of Section 2.   23 
Figure 10 











































































































































garch 1.372 1.857 1.072 0.697
st. dev. 1.228 1.859 1.000 0.696
































2.0 Stock Returns Unconditional Variance Taiwan
 
Note: the magnitude of the volatility that is depicted in all cases is the VARHAC estimate of den Haan. Also, the 
dashed line presents the volatility as given by the two segments defined by the official liberalisation date. The 
continuous line presents the volatility as given by the segments identified by the procedure of Section 2. 
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Figure 13 







































































































































garch 0.212 0.721 1.383 0.636
st. dev. 0.191 0.588 1.384 0.683
































2.0 Stock Returns Unconditional Variance Thailand
 
Note: the magnitude of the volatility that is depicted in all cases is the VARHAC estimate of den Haan. Also, the 
dashed line presents the volatility as given by the two segments defined by the official liberalisation date. The 
continuous line presents the volatility as given by the segments identified by the procedure of Section 2. 